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25.1. Anti-BEPS measures before the BEPS Project and policy impact of the BEPS 
Project 
 
New Zealand is a small country with an open economy that is well known for having an 
efficient and robust tax system. When it comes to international tax, New Zealand tends to 
prefer being a follower rather than a leader or early adopter. Under successive governments 
during the last 15 to 20 years, New Zealand has supported the work of the OECD, ensuring 
that it is – in all material respects – compliant with OECD recommendations and guidance. 
The release of the 15 Actions under the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
Project has seen the level of activity (by both officials and politicians) in New Zealand 
increase significantly. 
 
New Zealand considers its tax system to be largely robust and generally free from significant 
aggressive tax planning or base erosion and profit shifting prior to the announcement of the 
BEPS Project. New Zealand has made us of a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) for over 
100 years for income tax, with the current rule found in section BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 
(2007) (ITA).1 There is also a similar GAAR in section 76 of the Goods and Services Tax 
Act (1985),2 along with a number of specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs). Due to these 
sections in the legislation being framed in very broad terms, it has been left to the courts to 
interpret and apply the provisions, with the Supreme Court establishing the parliamentary 
contemplation test in 2008. Since that time, New Zealand’s Inland Revenue has won almost 
every case heard by the courts. Most omnibus tax bills each year would have a number of 
remedial and base protection amendments that deal with, generally, what are perceived (or, in 
some cases, actual) risks to the New Zealand tax base. As New Zealand is not a part of the 
European Union, any EU initiatives are not directly relevant unless they have been endorsed 
by the OECD. 
                                                 
* This paper sets out developments as at 31 Mar. 2019. 
1  NZ: Income Tax Act, 2007 [hereinafter ITA]. 




New Zealand’s Peer Review Report under the OECD Global Forum3 initiative determined 
that New Zealand was overall compliant. New Zealand was categorized as compliant on all 
but one aspect (on which aspect it was categorized as “largely compliant”).4 New Zealand 
welcomed this Report, indicating that it accepted the recommendations and would make the 
necessary changes. New Zealand also indicated that it fully endorses the international 
standards of transparency and exchange of information.5 
 
The earlier OECD reports, including those addressing issues of harmful tax practices,6 have 
been referred to infrequently in New Zealand tax reform proposals. This can be attributed to 
the absence of harmful tax practices identified in New Zealand’s tax system, along with New 
Zealand’s view that it did not support harmful tax competition. One instance where there was 
a perceived risk of a harmful tax practice concerned the benefits and risks associated with 
applying source-based taxation to non-resident portfolio investment entity investors through 
allowing a 0% tax rate to apply for non-resident investors.7 Prior to the BEPS work by the 
OECD on hybrid mismatches, the associated issues did not feature in any policy proposals 
within New Zealand, although the consequences of hybrid mismatches were emerging during 
the early 2010s. One example of a hybrid mismatch that reached the New Zealand courts was 
seen in the Alesco NZ v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Alesco) case.8 
                                                 
3 The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information (Global Forum) 
works to further the OECD’s work to address the risks to tax compliance posed by non-
cooperative jurisdictions. The original members of the Global Forum consisted of OECD 
countries and jurisdictions that had agreed to implement transparency and exchange of 
information for tax purposes. 
4 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, New Zealand: Peer Review Report Combined: Phase 1 + Phase 2, Incorporating 
Phase 2 Ratings (OECD 2013) [hereinafter New Zealand: Peer Review Report (2013)]. The 
area of “largely compliant” covered ownership and identity information. This followed the 
first report issued in 2011. 
5 OECD, New Zealand: Peer Review Report (2013), supra, at p. 99. 
6 OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global 
Issue (OECD 1998) [hereinafter Harmful Tax Competition (1998)]; OECD Ctr. for Tax 
Policy & Admin., The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress 
Report (OECD 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Progress Report (2001)]. 
7 Inland Revenue, Allowing a Zero Percent Tax Rate for Non-Residents Investing in a 
PIE: An Officials’ Issues Paper (Apr. 2010). 




A number of BEPS-related measures had already been proposed prior to finalization of the 
BEPS Project or were in the pipeline in New Zealand. No action was taken by New Zealand 
to counteract base erosion and profit shifting prior to the launch of the BEPS Project, which 
is not surprising given many of the BEPS issues were not present (for example, there were no 
identified harmful tax practices). 
 
In June 2016, Inland Revenue commented on New Zealand’s position with respect to where 
the country was placed concerning BEPS. Specifically, Inland Revenue commented on what 
it had completed (and proposals in the pipeline, most of which are now implemented or under 
consultation) with respect to how it has made New Zealand’s tax law more robust; increased 
international cooperation; and improved transparency and exchange of information.9 
 
Several confidential advice papers prepared for the Minister of Revenue were released 
publicly in 2014, setting out a timeline for New Zealand’s response to the BEPS Project and 
the degree of progress in that regard.10 This included specific progress on each of the 15 
BEPS Actions. Progress updates on the taxation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) were 
released from late 2012 through 2013.11 Clearly, the approach taken by the New Zealand 
government was to ensure that taxpayers and tax advisers were aware of New Zealand’s 
approach and progress on BEPS-related issues. 
 
                                                 
40. 
9 Inland Revenue, New Zealand’s Plan to Ensure Multinationals Pay Their Fair Share 
of Tax (June 2016), available at http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/2016-other-beps-
fact-sheet/overview (accessed 10 Apr. 2019).  
10 Inland Revenue (Policy and Strategy Group), Timeline for BEPS-Related Tax Policy 
Work (Nov. 2014), available at https://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/2014-other-beps-
report/overview (accessed 10 Apr. 2019) and Inland Revenue (Policy and Strategy Group), 
BEPS Progress update (Aug. 2014). 
11 Inland Revenue (Policy and Strategy Group), Taxation of Multinational Companies 
(Dec. 2012). See also Inland Revenue (Policy and Strategy Group), Taxation of 
Multinationals: Update (Apr. 2013), available at https://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/news/2013-04-
18-update-beps-work (accessed 10 Apr. 2019); Inland Revenue (Policy and Strategy Group), 
Taxation of Multinationals (Aug. 2013); Inland Revenue (Policy and Strategy Group), 
Further work on taxation of multinationals (Oct. 2013), available at 
http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/news/2013-10-25-further-work-taxation-multinationals (accessed 
10 Apr. 2019). 
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The BEPS Project has been central to the development of international tax policy in New 
Zealand over the last 2 to 3 years. The media have highlighted the content of consultation 
papers, drawing parallels between New Zealand’s approach and that of other jurisdictions, 
such as Australia and the United Kingdom. 
 
25.2. Measures against hybrid mismatch arrangements: BEPS Action 2 
 
Prior to the commencement of the BEPS Project, there were no specific plans to address 
hybrid mismatches, other than specific instances of mismatches detected through audits and 
reviews of taxpayer returns. However, as mentioned, a significant case involving a hybrid 
mismatch was the Alesco case,12 which concerned the issuing of optional convertible notes 
between an Australian company and its wholly-owned New Zealand subsidiary. 
 
The High Court and Court of Appeal concurred with the Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(Commissioner) that the issue of these optional convertible notes constituted a tax avoidance 
arrangement, with a confidential settlement being reached between the Commissioner and 
Alesco NZ just prior to the Supreme Court appeal hearing in 2014. This case served as a test 
case for a number of other MNEs using optional convertible notes. A number of these MNEs 
have subsequently settled with the Commissioner. Thus, it is possible that the Commissioner 
can continue to succeed under the GAAR without having need for specific anti-hybrid rules. 
No specific measures against hybrid mismatches were enacted after Alesco but changes were 
signalled in a discussion document issued in September 201613 that New Zealand would 
                                                 
12 Alesco (2013), supra n. 8. This case involved the issuance by Alesco NZ Ltd of 
optional convertible notes to Alesco Corporation Limited (its parent company in Australia) in 
return for advances totalling NZD 78 million for a term of 10 years. Alesco Corporation 
Limited had the option of being repaid NZD 78 million or converting the notes into new 
Alesco New Zealand Limited shares worth NZD 78 million. Alesco NZ claimed amortized 
interest deductions in accordance with the financial arrangements rules, which stipulated that 
such “hybrid” instruments be treated as containing both debt and equity elements. This 
interest notionally received by Alesco Corporation Limited was not taxable, as the notes were 
treated as equity instruments under Australian tax law. The New Zealand Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue contended that the optional convertible notes were a structured financial 
product that Alesco Corporation Limited bought from KPMG (its tax advisor) for the purpose 
of allowing the taxpayer to obtain impermissible tax benefits in New Zealand. The 
Commissioner’s view, applying economic reality, was that this constituted tax avoidance. 
13 Hon. Bill English & Hon. Michael Woodhouse, Addressing Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements: A Government Discussion Document (Sept. 2016). 
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follow the OECD’s recommendations contained in the Action 2 Final Report (Action 2)14 in 
their entirety and introduce specific anti-avoidance provisions for hybrids. Action 2 sets out 
numerous possible instances of hybrid mismatch arrangements and provides detailed 
recommendations (such as the scope of the rules, definitions and a number of sample 
provisions). The discussion document traversed these proposals, setting out specific questions 
for submitters to comment on. 
 
Submissions in respect of the discussion document closed on 17 October 2016. Despite 
lengthy consideration of these, the government confirmed in August 2017 that it would 
continue with its decision to adopt the “full suite of OECD recommendations on hybrid and 
branch mismatches”.15 Even after a change of government following the September 2017 
general election, the incoming government has continued with the outgoing government’s 
work on incorporating BEPS-related provisions into domestic law with the introduction of 
the Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Bill 2017 to Parliament on 6 
December 2017 (Tax Bill 2017).16 This Bill contained a range of measures to deal with PE 
avoidance and to strengthen New Zealand’s thin capitalization rules and comprehensive rules 
to address hybrid mismatch arrangements that exploit differences between countries’ tax 
rules in order to achieve an advantageous tax position. 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to review all the submissions on the discussion 
document on hybrid mismatches, the submissions of the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) 
and Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA-ANZ) are indicative of the wider 
opinion in New Zealand in respect of the hybrid mismatch proposals.17 
 
                                                 
14  OECD/G20, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements – Action 2: 
2015 Final Report (OECD 2015), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
15  Inland Revenue (Policy and Strategy Group), Base erosion and profit shifting: A 
summary of the key policy decisions p. 7 (Aug. 2017). 
16  NZ: Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Bill 2017, 6 Dec. 2017 
[hereinafter Tax Bill 2017]. This Bill has subsequently been enacted. The progress of the Bill 
can be found at https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-
laws/document/BILL_75623/tab/submissionsandadvice (accessed 10 Apr. 2019).  
17 NZLS, Submission on: Addressing Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: A Government 
Discussion Document (15 Nov. 2016); CA-ANZ, Submission on: Addressing Hybrid 
Mismatch Arrangements (Oct. 2016). 
6 
 
The NZLS, in its submission, largely supported the proposals, but expressed the concern that 
a number of the proposals contained in the discussion document could impose an undue 
burden on New Zealand taxpayers while seeking to further the global benefits of Action 2. 
The NZLS sought information quantifying the risk to the New Zealand tax base and the 
implications for New Zealand tax sovereignty should the New Zealand government enact 
rules to compensate for shortcomings in the global tax net. The NZLS then worked through 
each of the detailed proposals, expressing concern over a number of them. It also 
recommended a different order of preference in the choice of options set out in the discussion 
document. 
 
The CA-ANZ submission accepted the need for New Zealand to be a good global tax citizen, 
but stated as follows:18 
However, we are not convinced that adopting the OECD’s recommendations for 
addressing hybrid mismatches in the manner and timeframe envisaged is the correct 
approach. Rather we are concerned that adoption of the OECD’s very broad 
recommendations as set out in the Discussion Document in the implied timeframe of the 
next two years or less would be to the detriment of New Zealand businesses and the 
New Zealand economy generally. (Emphasis added.) 
 
Submitters argued that New Zealand should be focusing more on protecting its own national 
interests than taking into account other countries’ responses. It recommended that New 
Zealand not be an early adopter, but rather a follower. In moving forward, the authors 
endorse the recommendation of CA-ANZ, such that:19 
In our view the Government would be better advised to take a targeted approach to 
addressing hybrid mismatch arrangements. By this we mean an approach whereby any 
amendments to New Zealand’s domestic tax laws are focused specifically on the use of 
hybrid entities or instruments in New Zealand that the Government does not believe can 
be addressed by the existing law including the general anti-avoidance rule. 
A more targeted approach would result in law reform that is more relevant to the New 
Zealand ‘context’. It would also be able to take into account that New Zealand already 
has robust primary rules including the denial of foreign dividend exemptions for 
deductible dividends and a powerful and judicially supported general anti-avoidance 
rule. (Emphasis added.) 
 
The CA-ANZ, like the NZLS, then worked through the specific issues, recommending a 
number of significant changes. Both these organizations lodged similar submissions in 
                                                 
18 CA-ANZ, supra, at p. 1. 
19 Id., at p. 5. 
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respect of the Tax Bill 2017 but as many of their submissions on the earlier discussion 
document were not adopted, it was improbable that the government would make further 
changes to the Bill as a result of the second lot of submissions received. Consequently, only 
minor changes were made to the Tax Bill 2017 prior to its enactment. 
 
The authors largely concur with the views of NZLS and CA-ANZ that a better targeted 
approach would be preferable in respect of hybrid mismatches. By a targeted approach, the 
authors believe that New Zealand should adopt those OECD recommendations that are 
necessary to protect its tax base where the GAAR is not expected to be sufficient. New 
Zealand also needs to ensure that its legislation does not facilitate the use of hybrids that 
support non-compliance in other jurisdictions. This would see the changes to New Zealand’s 
law being relevant to the New Zealand context. This approach would suggest that, should 
further changes be necessary, i.e. if the GAAR in section BG 1 of the ITA or in section 76 of 
the Goods and Services Tax Act (1985)20 does not prove to be sufficient, these changes could 
be implemented by amending legislation. 
 
25.3. Controlled foreign company rules: BEPS Action 3 
 
New Zealand enacted controlled foreign company (CFC) rules with effect from April 1988 as 
part of a comprehensive package to stem tax avoidance by its residents using offshore 
entities.21 Initially, the CFC rules applied to all offshore entities with (a) controlling New 
Zealand shareholder(s), with an exemption for companies resident in what was termed a 
“grey list country”.22 As no exemption for “active” income was offered, the result was a very 
broad and comprehensive CFC regime. A foreign tax credit is allowed against New Zealand 
tax payable on any income attributed to a New Zealand shareholder. CFC losses are 
quarantined on a jurisdiction basis. 
 
In 2009, the CFC rules were revised to make them comparable to the Australian CFC rules, 
                                                 
20  NZ: Goods and Services Tax Act, 1985. 
21 The CFC rules are found in Subpart EX ITA. 
22 This grey list initially included Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. France was later removed from the list, while 
Norway and Spain were added. 
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improving the competitiveness of New Zealand companies offshore. From 2009, the 
exemption for grey list countries was reduced to only one country, namely Australia. 
Secondly, an “active” income exemption was introduced that applies to all companies 
resident in the rest of the world. To be exempt from income attribution, no more than 5% of a 
CFC’s total income may come from passive sources. 
 
New Zealand CFC rules did not require any changes to bring them into line with OECD 
BEPS best practice, as they already met all the recommendations in the six building blocks 
found in the BEPS Action 3 Final Report (Action 3).23,24 New Zealand’s CFC rules apply to 
all interests of New Zealand tax residents in non-resident companies if five or fewer residents 
have more than a 50% interest in those companies, or a single resident holds a 40% or more 
interest in those companies. As there are no exemptions from the scope of the rules if a non-
resident company is located in a specific country, they apply to all non-resident corporate 
entities. Thus, the New Zealand CFC rules are more rigorous than the recommendations 
contained in the first two building blocks in Action 3. Income from a CFC must be attributed 
to the resident shareholders if their “income interest” (effective economic interest) in the 
CFC’s capital is 10% or more. 
 
There are two exclusions from the income attribution requirement. The first is if the company 
is resident in Australia and the second if its passive income (interest, dividends, royalties and 
rents) is less than 5% of the CFC’s total income. These provisions are consistent with the 
recommendations in the third, fourth and fifth building blocks of Action 3. Foreign tax 
credits are allowed against the New Zealand tax payable on any attributed CFC income, 
while dividends paid by a CFC to New Zealand corporate shareholders are exempt from tax – 
which is consistent with the sixth building block of Action 3. 
 
Because New Zealand CFC rules are very comprehensive, there is no need for other rules 
(such as passive foreign investment company rules) to protect the New Zealand tax base from 
tax avoidance by its tax residents using offshore entities. New Zealand’s CFC rules are 
buttressed with comprehensive foreign investment fund (FIF) rules that apply to interests in 
                                                 
23 New Zealand’s CFC rules are found in Subpart EX ITA. 
24  OECD/G20, Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules – Action 3: 
Final Report (OECD 2015), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
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non-resident companies and funds when they do not fall within the scope of the CFC rules.25 
 
25.4. Interest deductions and other financial payments: BEPS Action 4 
 
New Zealand has a generous provision for interest deductibility by companies. Under section 
DB 7 of the ITA, all interest expense incurred by a company is deductible unless it is 
incurred in producing certain types of exempt income.26 Non-resident companies are also 
eligible to claim an interest deduction under section DB 7, but only to the extent that the 
interest expense is incurred in the course of carrying on a business through a “fixed 
establishment” (i.e. permanent establishment (PE)) in New Zealand. If a company is not 
eligible to claim a deduction under section DB 7, the company is still eligible to claim an 
interest deduction under section DB 6 of the ITA, which requires the taxpayer to establish a 
nexus between the interest expense and the derivation of assessable income. 
 
Any interest deduction falling within sections DB 6 and DB 7 may still be subject to 
apportionment under thin capitalization rules, which apply to both inbound and outbound 
investment. These thin capitalization rules are found in Subpart FE of the ITA and were first 
introduced in 1996. They were subsequently tightened in 2011 by reductions in the safe 
harbour debt-to-assets ratio. 
 
In the case of inbound investment, the thin capitalization rules apply where the taxpayer is a 
non-resident company or a resident company controlled by non-residents.27 In the case of 
outbound investment, the thin capitalization rules apply where a resident company has 
offshore CFC and/or foreign investment fund interests which result in no income attribution 
to the New Zealand company due to the active income exemption offered under the CFC 
rules. 
 
Under the thin capitalization rules, interest apportionment occurs when the New Zealand 
                                                 
25 The foreign investment fund rules are set out in Subpart EX ITA. 
26 See sec. DB 7(3) ITA. 
27 There is a separate set of thin capitalization rules that apply to New Zealand 
registered banks which are linked to bank regulatory capital requirements and regulations. 
These are significant, as most New Zealand registered banks are foreign-owned. 
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company’s debt percentage (the ratio of interest-bearing debt to total assets) exceeds 60% in 
the case of inbound investment and 75% for outbound investment. In the case of a worldwide 
group of which the resident entities are part, a higher debt percentage may apply, provided 
that the resident entities’ debt percentages do not exceed 110% of the worldwide group debt 
percentage. 
 
Where the thin capitalization rules apply to outbound investment, there are further 
concessions that limit the situations in which apportionment of interest expense could arise 
under the rules. If the New Zealand group assets are 90% or more of the worldwide group 
assets, there is no apportionment under the rules. There is also a de minimis rule under which 
no apportionment arises if the interest costs are less than NZD 1 million, with a tapering 
where the costs are above NZD 1 million and below NZD 2 million. 
 
There is also the option for the application of the thin capitalization rules to outbound 
investment where, instead of apportionment being determined according to debt percentages, 
the taxpayers elect to use a ratio based on interest expense to pre-tax cash flows. If this option 
is adopted, no interest apportionment will arise if the ratio of net interest expense to net 
income of the New Zealand group does not exceed 50% or 110% of the worldwide group’s 
interest expense ratio. 
 
New Zealand’s thin capitalization rules were not compliant with the BEPS recommendations 
in several ways. First, the New Zealand rules were largely balance sheet-based, with 
apportionment based on a ratio of interest-bearing debt to total assets rather than the income 
ratio-based approach. Only in the case of outbound investment could an income ratio-based 
apportionment be adopted as an option; it was not available in the case of inbound 
investment. Second, the BEPS proposals suggested that a threshold ratio of between 10% to 
30% of interest expense to EBITDA be adopted, while the New Zealand rules had a threshold 
ratio of 50% interest expense to EBITDA for outbound investment only. Third, there was no 
scope to carry forward any disallowed interest expense under the thin capitalization rules to 
future income years, nor any carve-out from the thin capitalization rules for third-party 
borrowing for infrastructure projects. 
 
On the other hand, the New Zealand rules complied with the BEPS recommendations in that 
there is a provision to relax the threshold ratio based on the worldwide income ratio. 
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Furthermore, there was a de minimis exemption from the apportionment rules for outbound 
investment. 
 
In March 2017, the New Zealand government released a discussion document titled BEPS – 
Strengthening Our Interest Limitation Rules,28 outlining proposed changes to New Zealand’s 
thin capitalization rules in response to the BEPS Action 4 Final Report (Action 4),29 and 
seeking public feedback. Notably, the government did not commit to shifting from a debts-to-
assets-based rule to an EBITDA rule, although the discussion in the rest of the discussion 
document suggested that the debts-to-assets-based rule would be retained (which was 
subsequently confirmed in August 2017). 
 
After considering submissions received in response to the above discussion document, in 
August 2017, the New Zealand government30 enacted the following changes to interest 
deductibility rules in response to the Action 4 recommendations.  
 
Firstly, although a cap on the interest rates charged on related-party debt was initially 
proposed in the discussion document, this has been replaced by a “restricted transfer pricing 
rule” in the Tax Bill 2017. This rule operates by establishing the group credit rating of the 
New Zealand borrower where there is a “high BEPS risk”. A “high BEPS risk” is where the 
New Zealand borrower has (i) a high level of debt in New Zealand (more than 40% of its 
assets); or (ii) high interest costs; or (iii) debt through a nil or low-tax jurisdiction. In these 
instances, the applicable interest rate will be set using the foreign parent’s credit rating minus 
1 unless the borrower’s own credit rating is equal to or higher than its parent’s credit rating.   
 
In cases where the presumed credit rating approach does not apply, the borrower’s standalone 
                                                 
28 Hon. Steven Joyce & Hon. Judith Collins, BEPS – Strengthening Our Interest 
Limitation Rules: A Government Discussion Document, Policy and Strategy, Inland Revenue 
Department, Wellington (Mar. 2017). 
29  OECD/G20, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments – Action 4: 2015 Final Report (OECD 2015), International 
Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
30 See media statement of Hon. Steven Joyce & Hon. Judith Collins, Government 
Announces BEPS Decisions (3 Aug. 2017), available at 
http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/news/2017-08-03-govt-announces-beps-decisions#statement 
(accessed 10 Apr. 2019). 
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credit rating can be used. When determining an appropriate interest rate for related-party 
debt, the following terms and conditions are to be disregarded: 
- loan terms of more than 5 years; 
- subordination; and 
- unusual features (such as interest payment deferral, convertibility at the option of the 
borrower) generally not found with arm’s length financing. 
 
Secondly, “non-debt liabilities” (being those liabilities that are not interest-bearing) are to be 
deducted from the entity’s assets in calculating the debt-to-assets ratio. 
 
Thirdly, the current de minimis rule for interest expense less than NZD 1 million applying to 
the outbound thin capitalization rules would be extended to inbound investment, unless the 
debt is “owner-linked”. 
 
Fourthly, in future, assets’ current market values will have to be made or verified by 
independent expert valuers with the current option to adopt values calculated using financial 
reporting standards. 
 
Fifthly, there will be a carve-out for certain infrastructure projects for third-party borrowing 
where the project is controlled by a single non-resident party.  
 
Some of the proposed changes raised concerns in the business and professional communities, 
as evidenced by the number of submissions to discussion document proposals31 and to 
revised provisions appearing in the current bill. While concerns about the proposed interest 
cap found in the discussion document were acted on, the credit rating approach contained in 
the bill also attracted adverse comment especially as this basis appears out of step with 
international practice.32 A substantial number of these submissions on the credit-rating 
approach were also adopted when the bill was finally passed in 2018.  
                                                 
31 See e.g. NZLS, Submission on: Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS): 
Strengthening our interest limitation rules (1 May 2017); CA-ANZ, Submission on: BEPS: 
Strengthening our interest limitation rules (20 Apr. 2017). 
32  See Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand, Submissions on the Taxation 
(Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Bill pp. 5-17 (8 Feb. 2018), as indicative of 




25.5. Countering harmful tax practices: BEPS Action 5 
 
As noted in section 25.1., New Zealand was not found to have any harmful practices 
following its Global Forum Peer Review in 2013.33 Consequently, the New Zealand 
government has not felt it necessary to develop policy and legislation to remove any harmful 
practices. Furthermore, as noted, earlier OECD reports (including the report on harmful tax 
practices),34 have been referred to occasionally in tax reform proposals. New Zealand also 
does not support harmful tax competition. 
 
The 1998 OECD harmful tax competition report35 had little direct relevance to New Zealand, 
as the country does not have the characteristics of a tax haven, namely: no or low taxes; lack 
of effective exchange of information; lack of transparency; and no requirement of substantial 
activity. When looking at New Zealand’s tax system overall, with its broad base and 
relatively high rates of tax, it is clear that it is not a tax haven in the general sense of the 
concept. 
 
As New Zealand is not a member of the European Union, EU developments are not relevant. 
Furthermore, there has not been any discussion of the issue of state aid in New Zealand, as 
this is an issue that features prominently in the European Union. This may in part be 
attributable to the underlying policy approach of adopting a broad base/low rate (BBLR) 
system. The BBLR is a coherent tax policy framework that seeks to appropriately balance 
(with trade-offs) a number of factors, namely efficiency, fairness, compliance costs and 
administration costs. It aims to have a broad base of taxation while keeping tax rates as low 
as possible.36 
 
                                                 
33 OECD, New Zealand: Peer Review Report (2013), supra n. 4.  
34 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition (1998), supra n. 6; OECD, 2001 Progress Report 
(2001), supra n. 6. 
35 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition (1998), supra n. 6. 
36 For further discussion of the BBLR in a New Zealand context, see A. Sawyer, Do 
Lawyers Make a Distinctive Contribution to Tax Policy-Making?: Reflections on the 
Contributions of Lawyers to Tax Policy-Making in New Zealand, 27 NZ Universities L. Rev. 
4, pp. 995-1022 (2017).  
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Nevertheless, the BBLR has some perceived deficiencies. For example, economic theory 
would argue that the most efficient mechanism to raise tax revenue would be to apply 
different tax rates to each taxpayer depending on its individual elasticities. The BBLR does 
not do this and, as such, is an example of where pragmatism outweighs economic theory. The 
BBLR also does not correct for positive and negative externalities to the extent that 
traditional economic theory would advocate (such as for failures to recognize the impact on 
the environment from economic activities). From a practical implementation perspective, a 
major deficiency of the BBLR base in New Zealand is the absence of a comprehensive 
capital gains tax, or at least taxation of wealth, land holdings and the like. Whether New 
Zealand should move down the path of developing and implementing a comprehensive 
capital gains tax is a contentious issue politically.37 
 
Subsequent to the 2014 OECD report, with respect to the Action 5 Deliverable,38 one area 
where New Zealand potentially had a harmful tax practice was in the limited level of 
disclosure obligations by foreign trusts set up in New Zealand. What is important to 
emphasize is not necessarily that the foreign trust regime itself is harmful, but that the 
inadequate disclosure requirements were enabling non-residents to take advantage of New 
Zealand’s clean reputation, and to use this regime in a manner that was not intended. The use 
of foreign trusts by non-residents came to the fore following revelations in the Panama 
Papers disclosing New Zealand’s involvement in facilitating alleged tax avoidance and 
evasion by overseas persons. The New Zealand government set up the Inquiry into Foreign 
                                                 
37 For a recent contribution to the debate over a capital gains tax in New Zealand, see 21 
NZ J. Taxn. L. & Policy 1 (2015) (special issue). A tax working group established by the 
government recommended a comprehensive CGT in its Feb. 2019 report. The proposal has 
been rejected by the New Zealand government on 17 Apr. 2019; see G. Robertson and S. 
Nash, Govt responds to Tax Working Group report, Media Release (17 Apr. 2019), available 
at http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/news/2019-04-17-government-responds-twg-
recommendations#statement (accessed 10 Apr. 2019). 
38 OECD/G20, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into 
Account Transparency and Substance – Action 5: 2014 Deliverable (OECD 2014), 
International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. New Zealand is not referred to in the 
OECD’s 2017 progress report on preferential regimes. OECD/G20, Harmful Tax Practices: 
2017 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes – Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Action 5 
(OECD 2017).  
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Trust Disclosure Rules in June 2016,39 with the subsequent Shewan Report40 making 
numerous recommendations to increase disclosure by foreign trusts. The vast majority of 
these recommendations were enacted in February 2017.41 As a consequence, it is likely that 
there is no longer a “reasonable likelihood” that the foreign trust regime supports tax 
evaders.42 New Zealand is now in a position where the OECD considers that its tax system 
has no “harmful preferential regimes”, with one tax expert believing most New Zealand 
foreign trusts will be wound up.43 Nevertheless, New Zealand can be described in one sense 
as being a foreign trust tax haven, in that it does not tax the foreign income on new migrants 
for a period of 4 years.44 
 
New Zealand has an active unilateral (and bilateral) advance pricing agreement (APA) 
regime, as well as a comprehensive binding advance ruling regime for public, private and 
product rulings.45 New Zealand has stated that it will disclose any rulings given by Inland 
Revenue that fall into any of the six categories highlighted as part of the BEPS Action 5 Final 
Report (Action 5),46 namely: 
                                                 
39 Establishment of the Government Inquiry into Foreign Trust Disclosure Rules, Notice 
2106-2253, NZ Gazette 33 (2016). 
40 The Treasury, J. Shewan, Government Inquiry into Foreign Trust Disclosure Rules 
(June 2016).  
41 See NZ: Taxation (Business Tax, Exchange of Information, and Remedial Matters) 
Act, 2017. 
42 Shewan, supra n. 40, at para. 1.13. 
43 E. Cadman, This Haven for Billionaires Has a Murky Trust Issue, Bloomberg (9 Feb. 
2017), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-08/jho-low-s-private-
jet-shines-light-on-new-zealand-s-murky-trusts. Foreign trusts will fall within the hybrid 
mismatch rules contained in the Tax Bill 2017 which will further reduce the attractiveness of 
having foreign trusts set up with New Zealand resident trustees. 
44 See further http://www.ird.govt.nz/yoursituation-nonres/move-nz/temp-tax-empt-
foreign-inc.html (accessed 10 Apr. 2019). 
45 For the New Zealand binding rulings regime, see Part 5A of the Tax Administration 
Act 1994. Unilateral APAs are issued as a form of private binding ruling under NZ: Tax 
Administration Act, 1994, Part 5A. Most of New Zealand’s bilateral APA work has been 
with Australia, although it has also completed bilateral APAs with Belgium, Canada, Japan, 
Korea (Rep.), Switzerland and the United States. New Zealand has not established any formal 
processes for obtaining an APA. This is on the basis that the number of requests is not high, 
and each case will be different, depending on a taxpayer’s specific facts and circumstances. 
46  OECD/G20, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into 
Account Transparency and Substance – Action 5: 2015 Final Report (OECD 2015), 
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- rulings relating to preferential regimes; 
- unilateral APAs or other cross-border unilateral rulings in respect of transfer pricing; 
- cross-border rulings providing for a downward adjustment of taxable profits; 
- PE rulings; 
- related-party conduit rulings; and 
- any other type of ruling agreed by the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices that, in the 
absence of spontaneous information exchange, gives rise to BEPS concerns. 
 
This applies to past rulings issued on or after 1 January 2010 and which are still in effect on 
or after 1 January 2014. It also applies to rulings issued on or after 1 April 2016. 
 
Prior to the BEPS Project, no harmful tax practices were identified by the OECD and New 
Zealand came through as “largely compliant” in its review by the OECD Global Forum. This 
reduced the amount of work that New Zealand has needed to comply with the 15 BEPS 
Actions, especially with respect to Action 5. The area of foreign trusts was subsequently 
revealed as an area where enhanced disclosure was necessary. While the changes to the 
disclosure rules for foreign trusts has already been enacted, the Tax Bill 2017 will catch 
foreign trusts as being “reverse hybrids” to prevent them being used for total non-taxation 
subject to a de minimis exemption.47  
 
25.6. Implementation of transfer pricing suggestions (BEPS Actions 8-10 and 13) and 
mandatory disclosure rules (BEPS Action 12) 
 
Inland Revenue published guidelines on transfer pricing in October 2000.48 These provide 
guidance on the practical application of the legislative requirements for transfer pricing 
contained in sections GC 6 to GC 14, inclusive, of the ITA. Specifically, section GC 6(1) 
provides as follows: 
The purpose of this section and sections GC 7 to GC 14 is to substitute an arm’s length 
consideration in the calculation of a person’s net income if the person’s net income is 
                                                 
International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
47  Supra n. 16, at p. 7 
48 Inland Revenue, Transfer Pricing Guidelines: A Guide to the Application of Section 




reduced by the terms of a cross-border arrangement with an associated person for the 
acquisition or supply of goods, services, or anything else. 
 
Since 2000, Inland Revenue has made two minor revisions to its administrative practice for 
services (namely increasing the threshold from NZD 100,000 to NZD 600,000, and again 
more recently to NZD 1 million). New Zealand does not intend to further update these 
guidelines, but rather, Inland Revenue will be applying the latest OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines (OECD Guidelines) (2017).49 The OECD Guidelines are considered to be 
consistent with New Zealand’s transfer pricing law and income tax treaties. It is the view of 
Inland Revenue that no legislation will be required to give effect to any of the changes in the 
OECD Guidelines. This reflects Inland Revenue’s interpretation of sections GC 6 to GC 14, 
especially section GC 13, which provides that the Commissioner has the power to determine 
arm’s length amounts. 
 
In March 2017, Inland Revenue released three government discussion documents, one of 
which concerned transfer pricing reform and permanent establishment avoidance.50 
Regarding permanent establishments (PEs), it proposed: 
- the introduction of a PE anti-avoidance rule that would apply to multinationals with 
global turnover exceeding EUR 750 million (the BEPS threshold for large 
multinationals) and which structure their New Zealand and business operations to 
avoid having a PE in New Zealand. The proposed rule would deemed a non-resident 
entity to have a PE in New Zealand if a related entity carried on sales-related 
activities in New Zealand for the non-resident. The new rule would also apply to 
third-party channel-provider arrangements where a non-resident supplied goods or 
services to New Zealand customers in effective partnership with an independent New 
Zealand distributor; 
- an amount of income would be deemed to have a source in New Zealand if New 
                                                 
49 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (OECD 2017), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
50 Hon. Steven Joyce & Hon. Judith Collins, BEPS: Transfer Pricing and Permanent 
Establishment Avoidance: A Government Discussion Document (Mar. 2017); Hon. Steven 
Joyce & Hon. Judith Collins, BEPS: Strengthening our interest limitation rules: A 
Government Discussion Document (Mar. 2017); Hon. Steven Joyce & Hon. Judith Collins, 
New Zealand’s Implementation of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent BEPS: A Government Discussion Document (Mar. 2017). 
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Zealand has the right to tax that income under the PE article of any applicable tax 
treaty. New Zealand’s model treaty PE article would be incorporated into domestic 
law as an additional source rule applying to non-residents to which no tax treaty 
applies; 
- a non-resident’s income would have a source in New Zealand if that income would 
have a New Zealand source and if the non-resident’s wholly-owned group were 
treated as a single entity; and 
- amendments to the life insurance source rules and foreign investment fund rules such 
that no deductions would be available for reinsurance of life policies if the premium 
income on the policies was not taxed in New Zealand, and to ensure that residents are 
subject to the foreign investment fund (FIF) rules in respect of any insurance policies 
not subject to New Zealand tax. 
 
The New Zealand government announced in August 201751 that while it would proceed with 
the anti-avoidance provision for PEs, the rule would be more narrowly targeted at avoidance 
arrangements. The resulting provisions in the Tax Bill 2017, enacted by the New Zealand 
Parliament, appear to more closely follow Australia’s multinational anti-avoidance law and 
the UK diverted profits tax. The New Zealand government has not ruled out adopting a 
diverted profits tax in future should the PE rule changes prove to be ineffective. 
 
In respect of transfer pricing rules, the discussion document proposed: 
- strengthening the rules so that they align with the OECD Guidelines and Australia’s 
transfer pricing rules, namely: 
- the legal form would be disregarded if it did not align with the economic 
substance of the transaction (with Inland Revenue able to reconstruct a 
transaction); 
- where independent entities would not have agreed to a contractual condition, 
the transfer pricing rules would allow the condition, or the entire arrangement, 
to be set aside; and 
- the law would specifically refer to arm’s length conditions and the latest 
OECD Guidelines; 
- the burden of proof for demonstrating arm’s length conditions would be shifted to the 
                                                 
51 Joyce & Collins, Government Announces BEPS Decisions, supra n. 30. 
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taxpayer (although there would be no mandatory documentation requirement); 
- the time bar for issuing transfer pricing assessments would be increased to 7 years 
(from 4 years) (consistent with Australia and Canada); and 
- the transfer pricing rules would also apply to investors that “act together” or “act in 
concert”, such as private equity investors. 
 
These proposed changes are in line with the BEPS Actions 8-10 Final Report (Actions 8-
10).52. Many of the submissions on the discussion document expressed concern that the 
proposals took a heavy handed approach; would introduce changes that would be difficult to 
enforce and apply (such as the proposed economic substance test); or significantly changed 
well established practice in New Zealand (such as the change in the burden of proof) and 
require multinationals to pay disputed tax earlier.53 It was also unclear as to how these 
changes would interface with New Zealand’s existing DTAs, notwithstanding the proposed 
multilateral treaty amendment initiative, which is discussed in section 25.7. The government 
subsequently announced in August 201754 that, while it will proceed with the proposals 
regarding transfer pricing recharacterization, the reconstruction provisions will be based on 
the test in the OECD Guidelines. 
 
As New Zealand largely follows the OECD Guidelines,55 the UN Manual on Transfer Pricing 
and the World Bank Handbook on Transfer Pricing are not directly applicable. New Zealand 
has very few tax treaties with developing countries;56 the vast majority are with developed 
countries (most being members of the OECD) or the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa). Those treaties with developing countries are primarily situations 
where the jurisdiction is a significant trading partner of New Zealand. As New Zealand is not 
                                                 
52  OECD/G20, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation – Actions 8-
10: 2015 Final Reports (OECD 2015), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
53 NZLS, Submission on: Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) – Transfer Pricing 
and Permanent Establishment Avoidance: A Government Discussion Document (1 May 
2017); CA-ANZ, Submission on: BEPS: Transfer Pricing and Permanent Establishment 
Avoidance: A Government Discussion Document (18 Apr. 2017). 
54 Joyce & Collins, Government Announces BEPS Decisions, supra n. 30. 
55 See discussion in supra n. 50.  
56 For further details on New Zealand’s tax treaties, see http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/tax-
treaties (accessed 10 Apr. 2019). 
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a member of the European Union, none of the EU-specific changes are relevant. 
 
Inland Revenue has advised that it will collect information required under the OECD 
country-by-country reporting regime from multinational groups with over EUR 750 million 
of annual consolidated group revenue. Inland Revenue believes that it has sufficient powers 
to meet the country-by-country reporting requirements without significant legislative 
amendment. Inland Revenue anticipates that the new country-by-country reporting 
requirements will affect only 20 New Zealand-headquartered corporate groups, and is 
contacting each group directly to ensure that they are adequately prepared for the new 
country-by-country reporting requirements.57 
 
New Zealand already has automatic exchange of information in place. From 1 July 2017, 
financial institutions will need to begin meeting obligations under the OECD Common 
Reporting Standard (CRS) for the automatic exchange of information with respect to 
financial account information.58 The Taxation (Business Tax, Exchange of Information, and 
Remedial Matters) Act received Royal assent on 21 February 2017. The approach of New 
Zealand as adopted in the legislation is essentially to incorporate the CRS directly into New 
Zealand law by reference, and to require the application of the CRS to be consistent with the 
Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.59,60 
 
Inland Revenue has introduced an annual questionnaire designed to collect information about 
debt financing and transfer pricing issues from certain international companies operating in 
New Zealand. This information will be used to assist with risk analysis and BEPS-related 
                                                 
57 One of the authors (Sawyer) has undertaken research with a colleague from 
Queensland University of Technology into the preparedness of the tax profession and their 
multinational clients in Australia and New Zealand for country-by-country reporting. See K. 
Sadiq and A. Sawyer, “Country by Country Tax Reporting: A Critical Analysis of Enhanced 
Regulatory Requirements for Multinational Corporations”, 36 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 7, pp. 570-586 (2009).  
58 This gives effect to the OECD/G20 standard for automatic exchange of financial 
account information in tax matters. 
59 For further information on the Common Reporting Standard, see 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/ (accessed 10 Apr. 
2019). 
60  Most recently, OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (21 Nov. 
2017), Models IBFD.  
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policy developments. This information will not be made public other than where financial 
reporting requirements under the International Financial Reporting Standards may require 
certain disclosures to be made. 
 
The ability of Inland Revenue to access information and documents held by large 
multinationals offshore has been increased. A number of administrative rules will be 
introduced to give effect to these powers, including: 
- where a large multinational does not cooperate with Inland Revenue, the latter may 
more readily issue a notice of proposed assessment (or other documents in a dispute 
resolution process) based on information it has available at the time; 
- in disputes concerning transfer pricing, the amount of New Zealand-source income 
and the application of a tax treaty, any disputed tax must be paid earlier in the dispute 
process; 
- tax payable by any member of a large multinational may be collected from any 
wholly-owned group member, or a related New Zealand entity falling under the new 
PE rules; and 
- Inland Revenue will have the power to collect more information from large MNEs, 
including information about an MNE’s various non-resident members. 
 
In its announcement in August 2017,61 the government stated that it will proceed with all of 
the proposed changes, including increasing Inland Revenue’s powers to deal with 
“uncooperative” large multinationals, but will not require the tax to be paid in advance. 
 
Under the Action 12 Final Report (Action 12),62 New Zealand currently has no specific 
requirements or any plans to legislate for such disclosure requirements. While there are no 
mandatory disclosure rules (and no indication that any such rules are planned), Inland 
Revenue has, however, commenced issuing an annual international tax questionnaire to 
multinational enterprises to gather specific information. The international questionnaire is 
designed to collect key information about financing/debt and transfer pricing issues. It is only 
two pages long, with one page of key metrics and one page of mostly Yes/No-type questions, 
                                                 
61 Joyce & Collins, Government Announces BEPS Decisions, supra n. 30. 
62  OECD/G20, Mandatory Disclosure Rules – Action 12: 2015 Final Report (OECD 
2015), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
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with the possibility to add comments. Guidance notes are provided with the questionnaire. 
Specifically, the information is intended to:63 
- enhance Inland Revenue’s risk assessment processes supported by the current Basic 
Compliance Package and Compliance Management processes that Inland Revenue 
already has in place. This is intended to enable Inland Revenue to provide greater 
certainty and further adapt its interventions to facilitate compliance for multinationals 
within New Zealand; and 
- assist New Zealand in meeting its international obligations in relation to BEPS and 
further inform key tax policy decisions for New Zealand. 
 
While New Zealand generally takes an open, consultative and transparent approach to tax and 
other policy developments, it takes a firm line on not disclosing information about specific 
taxpayers’ tax affairs. This stance is largely due to the overarching secrecy obligations 
contained in Part 4 of the Tax Administration Act (1994). Disclosure by taxpayers of 
information to Inland Revenue is a statutory requirement when formal requests are made 
under sections 16 and 17 of that Act. However, this information would normally not be 
publicly disclosed unless there is a specific requirement to do so. Exceptions include certain 
penalties (such as for criminal evasion), or via the court phase of a tax dispute resolution 
process. 
 
New Zealand does not have a formal constitution as such, but within its foundational 
documents (such as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990) and the Treaty of Waitangi64), 
there are a number of protected rights, although no specific right to privacy.65 This “right to 
privacy”, in a tax context is largely limited to the protections (and exceptions) set out in Part 
4 of the Tax Administration Act (1994). The current proposals are unlikely to violate the 
limited protections, including privacy rules, in the Tax Administration Act (1994). Should 
                                                 
63 See further http://www.ird.govt.nz/international/business/questionnaire/ (accessed 10 
Apr. 2019). 
64 NZ: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, and NZ: Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975, 
Schedule 1, referring to New Zealand’s founding document of 1840. 
65 While many specific rights are set out in the Bill of Rights Act (1990), there is no 
specific mention of a right to privacy. However, sec. 28 of that Act states as follows: “Other 
rights and freedoms not affected: An existing right or freedom shall not be held to be 
abrogated or restricted by reason only that the right or freedom is not included in this Bill of 
Rights or is included only in part”. 
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New Zealand change its stance with respect to Action 12, the draft policy and legislation 
would need to be closely examined to ensure that it does not violate existing protections and 
privacy provisions. 
 
In terms of Actions 8-10 and 12, New Zealand will continue to follow the OECD Guidelines 
but will not formally incorporate them into domestic tax law. The changes to the PE 
avoidance and transfer pricing rules will have been made a little more palatable with the 
government’s announcement on 5 August 2017 to restrict their scope compared to what was 
initially proposed.66 New Zealand is furthermore in the process of implementing country-by-
country reporting, although it does not believe that any significant legislative change is 
required given that there are only 19 MNEs headquartered in New Zealand, each of which is 
closely followed by Inland Revenue. Finally, New Zealand does not have, nor does it propose 
to introduce, mandatory disclosure rules. 
 
25.7. Implementation of the MLI: BEPS Action 15 
 
As a member of the OECD and due to concerns about multinational tax avoidance, New 
Zealand worked actively with the OECD and G20 in the drafting of the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (MLI). New Zealand signed the MLI67 in early June 2017 in respect of all parts of 
that convention. Ideally, it wanted all of its existing 40 tax treaties to be covered treaties 
under the MLI unless: 
- the other contracting state did not intend to sign the MLI; or 
- an existing tax treaty is being renegotiated and the provisions of the MLI are expected 
to be included in the new tax treaty. 
 
When signing the MLI, New Zealand originally designated that 36 of its 40 tax treaties would 
be covered agreements under the MLI. The four treaties excluded were those with Fiji, 
Samoa, Taiwan and the United States. Fiji is a signatory to the MLI, and a new treaty is being 
negotiated, which explains why New Zealand did not designate the existing Fijian treaty as a 
                                                 
66 Joyce & Collins, Government Announces BEPS Decisions, supra n. 30. 
67 OECD, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (7 June 2017), Treaties IBFD. 
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covered agreement.  
 
New Zealand has tax treaties with a number of states which it would like to be covered under 
the MLI, but these respective states have not signed the MLI as at 31 March 2019. They are 
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Taking into account that the Fiji tax treaty is not a 
covered agreement because a new tax treaty is under negotiation which is likely to be 
compliant with the MLI (as Fiji has already signed the MLI), only 33 tax treaties out of a 
possible 40 will – at this stage – be covered by the MLI. 
 
New Zealand has deferred negotiating new tax treaties until the MLI has been signed and 
come into effect. New Zealand’s last tax treaty to be signed was that with Samoa in July 
2015. It is understood that a number of tax treaty negotiations are in progress, a number of 
which are with states that have signed the MLI.68 
 
In March 2017, the New Zealand government released a discussion document69 outlining 
how it would implement the MLI. The MLI will be treated domestically in the same way as 
any double tax agreement pursuant to section BH 1 of the ITA. This section has been 
amended to allow for multilateral conventions to be implemented in addition to bilateral 
double tax agreements. 
 
After New Zealand signed the MLI, it was tabled in the New Zealand House of 
Representatives on 10 August 2017. This was followed by a national interest analysis, which 
is required of all treaties tabled in the House of Representatives. Following review by a 
Select Committee, an Order in Council will be submitted to the Cabinet for approval and – 
once in force – New Zealand will ratify the MLI by submitting a ratification instrument to the 
OECD depository. New Zealand will also confirm its list of reservations, notifications and 
                                                 
68 New tax treaties are being negotiated with Luxembourg, Portugal, Saudi Arabia and 
the Slovak Republic; only Saudi Arabia has not signed the MLI. Replacement tax treaties are 
under negotiation with Canada, Fiji, Korea (Rep.), Norway and the United Kingdom – all of 
which have signed the MLI. See http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/tax-treaties as at 23 Aug. 2017. 
69 Inland Revenue (Policy and Strategy Group), New Zealand’s Implementation of the 
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS: An 
Officials’ Issues Paper (Mar. 2017). Submissions have been sought (and are now closed). A 
number of the proposals may in part depend upon the outcome of the consultation process on 





The New Zealand government will not issue consolidated versions of its existing tax treaties 
that are modified by the MLI. This is consistent with their existing treatment of amending 
protocols to tax treaties that are negotiated from time to time. It has said that commercial 
publishers are free to produce consolidated versions if they wish, although such versions will 
obviously have no special legal standing. Fortunately, as New Zealand is an English-speaking 
country and all its tax treaties are in English, there will be no translation issues with 
implementing the MLI. In some cases, treaty partners may face translation issues, as some 
New Zealand tax treaties are in two languages, both of which are held to be authentic. 
 
The MLI will come into effect and modify specific tax treaties once both parties to a tax 
treaty have signed and ratified the MLI. Therefore, existing treaties will be modified 
individually over a period of time as this process occurs. For withholding taxes, the changes 
arising from the MLI will take effect from 1 January of the following calendar year either 
beginning on or after the latest date on which the MLI comes into force for each of the parties 
to a covered tax treaty. For other income tax matters, it will apply to income years beginning 
on or after a 6-month period from the latest date on which the MLI comes into force for each 
of the parties to a covered tax treaty. At the moment, precise dates are not determinable, but 
New Zealand is seeking to negotiate to make modifications to its covered agreements. 
 
It is unfortunate that it appears the MLI will apply to only 33 of New Zealand’s 40 tax 
treaties. A number of key Asia-Pacific countries have not signed the MLI and their intentions 
with respect to the MLI are not entirely clear.  
 
25.8. Specific issues regarding tax treaty provisions: BEPS Actions 2, 6, 7 and 14 
 
New Zealand followed all of the substantive BEPS provisions in the MLI where they are 
relevant.70 New Zealand has already adopted many of the BEPS Actions in its existing tax 
treaties, but on a selective basis, so that adopting the MLI will result in a more consistent 
                                                 
70 For example, art. 5 MLI to strengthen the exemption method used to relieve double 
taxation, is not relevant to New Zealand, as it prefers to grant a foreign tax credit rather than 
an exemption to relieve international double taxation. 
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approach over all covered agreements than is the case now. 
 
Not all New Zealand tax treaties contain a provision dealing with fiscally transparent entities 
such as partnerships and trusts. Only the treaties with Australia, Chile, Japan and the United 
States currently contain such a provision, and thus adoption of article 3 of the MLI will 
provide greater protection against tax avoidance using such entities for all its covered 
agreements. While most New Zealand treaties contain a residence tie-breaker clause for 
corporate entities, adoption of article 4 of the MLI will provide a more robust provision 
against tax avoidance arrangements using dual-resident companies. 
 
New Zealand has not adopted a policy of including a limitation-on-benefits article in its tax 
treaties. Only its tax treaty with the United States contains such an article.71 However, a 
number of its treaties contain limited anti-abuse provisions that apply in respect of two 
matters, namely: 
- eligibility to receive tax sparing benefits;72 and 
- eligibility for zero withholding tax on intercompany dividends where the voting 
interest in the subsidiary company is above a certain level.73 
 
In the case of tax-sparing benefits, the anti-abuse clause is more akin to a principal-purpose 
test, while in the case of eligibility for the exemption from withholding tax for intercompany 
dividends, the anti-abuse provision is more akin to a limitation-on-benefits article that is 
based on several so-called black-letter tests. 
 
New Zealand has elected to adopt article 7(4) of the MLI using a principal-purpose test. The 
                                                 
71 Convention between the United States of America and New Zealand for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income 
art. 16 (23 July 1982) (amended through 2008), Treaties IBFD, as modified by art. 11 Second 
Protocol to this treaty signed 1 Dec. 2008.  
72 Protocols appended to the China-New Zealand Income Tax Treaty 1986 (new 2019 
DTA not in force), Fiji-New Zealand Income Tax Treaty 1976, India-New Zealand Income 
Tax Treaty 1986 and Korea (Rep.)-New Zealand Income Tax Treaty 1981. The New 
Zealand-Singapore Income Tax Treaty 2009 and the New Zealand-Vietnam Income Tax 
Treaty 2013 contain similar provisions in their art. 23 (Relief of Double Taxation) where the 
tax sparing provisions are found. 
73 For Australia and the United States, the threshold is 80% or greater voting power, 
while for Hong Kong the threshold has been set lower, at 50%. 
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reason for this choice, explained in an earlier issues paper,74 is that the principal-purpose test 
is very similar to New Zealand’s GAAR found in section BG 1 of the ITA. The New Zealand 
GAAR has been successfully invoked by the Commissioner in response to a variety of tax 
avoidance schemes, and thus there is confidence in New Zealand as to such an approach.75 
Under the principal-purpose test, treaty benefits will be denied if the principal purpose of an 
arrangement is to secure tax treaty benefits. 
 
New Zealand will follow the arbitration provisions in articles 23(5) and 24(2) of the MLI. 
Currently, very few New Zealand tax treaties allow for arbitration of disputes that are not 
resolved under the mutual agreement procedure. However, it has reserved its right for Part IV 
of the MLI not to apply in respect of covered agreements where the other contracting 
jurisdiction has made a reservation pursuant to article 23(6). In respect of article 24(2), it has 
reserved the right for that provision to apply only to covered agreements that will apply 
article 23(2). New Zealand has also entered a general reservation to the arbitration provisions 
in Part VI of the MLI to exclude from those provisions cases involving the application of 




                                                 
74 Supra n. 69.  
75 See e.g. the Alesco (2013) case, discussed in sec. 25.2. 
